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liquidity and property prices. Most work on EWS has been for global samples dominated by 
emerging market crises where time series data on bank capital adequacy and property prices 
are typically absent. We estimate logit crisis models for OECD countries, finding strong 
effects from capital adequacy and liquidity ratios as well as property prices, and can exclude 
traditional variables. Higher capital adequacy and liquidity ratios have a marked effect on the 
crisis probabilities, implying long run benefits to offset some of the costs that such regulations 
may impose. 
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1 Introduction 
There is a large literature on systemic banking crisis prediction via so called early warning 
systems (EWSs) which utilise a range of estimators from panel logit (as in Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache 2005, Davis and Karim 2008a) to signal extraction (Kaminsky and Reinhart 
1999, Borio and Lowe 2002, Borio and Drehmann 2009) to binary recursive trees (Duttagupta 
and Cashin 2008, Karim 2008, Davis and Karim 2008b).  
 
The success of these models at predicting crises varies, with the logit and binary trees 
outperforming signal extraction in terms of type I and type II errors.
2 Nevertheless, a shared 
feature of these previous studies has been their reliance on cross-sections of heterogeneous 
economies and a common set of explanatory variables. Following Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998), banking crises have been explained using macroeconomic and financial 
variables such as real GDP growth, terms of trade and domestic real credit growth. The 
reliance on generic indicators stems in part from the dearth of data on more specific banking 
sector and asset price variables for many emerging market countries that are nevertheless 
included in samples in order to boost the number of infrequent banking crisis observations.  
 
Nonetheless, the specifications of such models are undoubtedly inadequate for two reasons. 
Firstly, the triggers of a crisis depend on the type of economy and the nature of the banking 
system. For example, in advanced economies with high levels of banking intermediation and 
developed financial markets, shocks to terms of trade are less important crisis triggers than, 
say, property price bubbles. This implies EWS design could be improved by focusing on a 
certain class of economies and selecting explanatory variables that are relevant to their 
banking structures and lending behaviour. 
 
                                                 
2 See Davis and Karim (2008a) and Karim (2008).   3
Secondly, (and related to the previous point), developed economy banking systems are more 
likely to be regulated in terms of capital adequacy and liquidity ratios. Financial regulators 
will be mandated to monitor such ratios to restrict instability, which implies these variables 
are at least used implicitly as EWSs. Previous EWSs failed to incorporate balance sheet 
variables as explicit banking crisis predictors, perhaps because of a lack of foresight on the 
part of regulators. It is also possible that EWS design never evolved in this direction because 
banking crises in developed economies were viewed as highly unlikely over the past decade 
when this literature has developed and hence despite data availability, new leading indicators 
of crises have not been assessed for their explanatory power.  
 
In this paper, we address these deficiencies in EWS design. We develop an EWS which 
demonstrates that unweighted capital adequacy (often known as the leverage
3 ratio) and the 
liquidity ratio alongside real house price growth are the most important crisis determinants for 
OECD economies. Moreover, their importance remains invariant to different robustness tests 
and we can use the information they convey to predict the sub-prime episode out-of-sample. 
Since these variables have hitherto been unexamined, our results have important policy 
implications for financial regulators and central banks; optimising the liquidity and capital 
adequacy
4 ratios of banks and suppressing rapid property price growth may well mitigate 
future OECD crises.  
 
                                                 
3 Note this definition of the banking leverage ratio (i.e. capital/unadjusted assets) operates contrary to normal 
concepts of leverage, in the sense that a higher “leverage ratio” means lower “leverage” in an economic sense of 
debt-to-equity. Accordingly we prefer to use the term “unweighted capital adequacy” to avoid ambiguity. 
4 Note that although for data reasons we use the unweighted capital adequacy ratio, we expect that risk adjusted 
capital is also a crisis indicator. Our overall view is that both ratios need to be borne in mind in assessing crisis 
risk.   4
The paper is structured as follows, in Section 2 we outline the panel logit methodology we 
have adopted, and we introduce the dataset. In Section 3 we detail the results. In Section 4 we 
provide some analysis of the robustness of our results. Section 5 concludes and makes some 
suggestions regarding policy implications. We also include an annex on patterns of marginal 
effects. 
 
2.  Methodology and Data 
 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) used the multivariate logit technique to relate the 
probabilities of systemic banking crises to a vector of explanatory variables. The banking 
crisis dependent variable, a binary banking crisis dummy, is defined in terms of observable 
stresses to a country’s banking system, e.g. ratio of non-performing loans to total banking 
system assets exceeds 10%
5, and it occurs in around 5 per cent of all time and country 
observations in that paper. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) updated the banking crises 
list to include more years, and more crises. 
 
Such crisis dummies generate several problems. Firstly, the start and end dates are 
ambiguous. It could be a while after the onset of crisis before the crisis criteria are observably 
met, and the criteria themselves are static, revealing nothing about when the crisis terminates. 
Since the end dates are to some extent subjectively chosen there are potential endogeneity 
problems with estimation: the explanatory variables will be affected by ongoing crises. To 
mitigate this, in our core results we terminate our estimation before the sub-prime episode. 
Secondly, the timing of the crises is crude in the sense that for annual dummies, a crisis 
starting in December 2000 would generate a value of 1 in 2000 and zero in 2001. However we 
                                                 
5 Their actual criteria are: the proportion of non-performing loans to total banking system assets exceeded 10%, 
or the public bailout cost exceeded 2% of GDP, or systemic crisis caused large scale bank nationalisation, or 
extensive bank runs were visible and if not, emergency government intervention was visible.   5
are concerned with predicting the switch between crisis and non-crisis states and accordingly 
we assume one year crisis duration. For the example given, we accept our dummy takes a 
value of 1 in 2000 and zero thereafter, although we will later relax this assumption and show 
our results remain robust.    
 
Table 1: List of systemic and non-systemic crises 
 
BG CN DK FN FR GE IT JP NL NW SP SD UK US
1980 00000000000000
1981 00000000000000
1982 00000000000000
1983 01000000000000
1984 00000000000010
1985 00000000000000
1986 00000000000000
1987 00100000000000
1988 00000000000001
1989 00000000000000
1990 00000010010000
1991 00010001000110
1992 00000000000000
1993 00000000000000
1994 00001000000000
1995 00000000000010
1996 00000000000000
1997 00000000000000
1998 00000000000000
1999 00000000000000
2000 00000000000000
2001 00000000000000
2002 00000000000000
2003 00000000000000
2004 00000000000000
2005 00000000000000
2006 00000000000000
2007 00000000000011  
 Note:BG-Belgium, CN-Canada, DK-Denmark, FN-Finland, FR-France, GE-Germany, IT-Italy, JP-Japan, NL-
Netherlands, NW-Norway, SP-Spain, SD-Sweden, UK-United Kingdom, US-USA. 
 
Our dataset includes 14 systemic and non systemic crises in 14 OECD countries. Information 
concerning systemic banking crises is taken from the IMF Financial Crisis Episodes database 
which covers the period of 1970-2007.
6 Non-systemic crises are collected from the World 
Bank database of banking crises over the period of 1974-2002.
7 The sample covers
8: Belgium, 
                                                 
6 See Laeven and Valencia (2007) 
7 See Caprio and Klingebiel (2003)   6
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Spain, UK and the US over the period 1980-2007. Table 1 presents the matrix of crises, with 
shaded observations indicating systemic crises. The frequency of crises in our data set is 3.2 
per cent which is marginally below the 5 per cent in Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), 
but is well within acceptable bounds for the style of analysis. 
 
Our variables cover the years 1980 – 2007, but the sample is partitioned into 1980 – 2006 for 
in-sample estimation whilst 2007 data is used for out-of-sample prediction. For bank-
regulatory target variables, given the cross country dataset, we have used the unweighted 
capital adequacy (leverage
9) ratio and not an estimate of risk-adjusted capital adequacy for the 
estimation. The unweighted capital adequacy ratio is the ratio of capital and reserves for all 
banks to the end of year total assets as shown by the balance sheet. Our corresponding 
measure of liquidity is the ratio of the sum of cash and balances with central banks and 
securities for all banks over the end of year total assets as shown by the balance sheet. 
Unweighted capital adequacy and liquidity ratios were constructed using data from the OECD 
income statement and balance sheet database for all countries apart from the UK. Any missing 
OECD database observations, as well as the data for 2006 and 2007, were obtained from 
individual Central Banks and the BankScope
10 database. The OECD database does not supply 
figures for the UK. The unweighted capital adequacy ratio was defined as for other countries 
and was constructed using Bank of England aggregate data. We also constructed UK liquidity 
                                                                                                                                                          
8 Choice of the countries is limited by the availability of the data for our time period. 
9 See footnote 3. 
10 For the liquidity measure, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets for the top 200 banks in a country in question 
was calculated.   7
ratios using Financial Services Authority (FSA) data, where liquidity was defined as the ratio 
of liquid assets
11 over total assets.  
 
As regards the explanatory variables employed, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), who 
had 77 crises in their sample, found that they were correlated with macroeconomic, banking 
sector and institutional indicators. Crises occurred in periods of low GDP growth, high 
interest rates and high inflation, as well as large fiscal deficits. On the monetary side, the ratio 
of broad money to Foreign Exchange reserves and the credit to the private sector/GDP ratio, 
as well as lagged credit growth were found to be significant. Institutionally, countries with 
low GDP per capita are more prone to crises, as are those with deposit insurance. All these 
results were broadly in line with their 1998 paper which featured 31 crises, except that 
depreciation and the terms of trade ceased to be significant. 
 
In order to align our study with previous work, we include the explanatory variables used by 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and Davis and Karim (2008a) (see Box 1). These 
variables are constructed using the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database and 
World Bank Development (WDI) data. We did not include some typical variables because 
they are clearly irrelevant to OECD countries, for example, GDP per capita is broadly 
comparable across OECD countries, while virtually all OECD countries have some form of 
deposit insurance scheme. Meanwhile credit/GDP (as opposed to credit growth) may reflect 
the nature of the financial system in OECD countries (i.e. bank versus market dominated) 
rather than risk of crisis. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Sum of cash, gold bullion and coin, central government and central bank loans, advances and bills held and 
central government and central bank investments (i.e. securities).   8
Box 1: List of Variables (with variable key) 
 
1. Real GDP Growth (%)   (YG) 
2. Real Interest Rate (%)   (RIR) 
3. Inflation (%)   (INFL) 
4. Fiscal Surplus/ GDP (%)   (BB) 
5. M2/ Foreign Exchange Reserves (%)   (M2RES) 
Variables used in 
previous studies: 
Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2005); 
Davis and Karim (2008). 
6. Real Domestic Credit Growth (%)   (DCG) 
7. Liquidity ratio (%) (LIQ) 
8. Unweighted capital adequacy ratio (%) (LEV) 
Variables introduced in 
this study. 
9. Real Property Price Growth (%) (RHPG) 
 
Turning next to our estimator, we use the cumulative logistic distribution which relates the 
probability that the dummy takes a value of one to the logit of the vector of n explanatory 
variables:  
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where Yit is the banking crisis dummy for country i at time t, β is the vector of coefficients, 
Xit is the vector of explanatory variables and F(β Xit) is the cumulative logistic distribution. 
The log likelihood function which is used to obtain actual parameter estimates is given by:  
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Although the signs on the coefficients are easily interpreted as representing an increasing or 
decreasing effect on crisis probability, the values are not as intuitive to interpret. Equation (2) 
shows the coefficients on Xit are not constant marginal effects of the variable on banking 
crisis probability since the variable’s effect is conditional on the values of all other 
explanatory variables at time t. Rather, the coefficient ßi represents the effect of Xi when all 
other variables are held at their sample mean values. Whilst this makes the detection of non-
linear variable interactions difficult, (the logit link function is linear), the logistic EWS has the 
benefit of being easily replicable by policy makers concerned with potential systemic risk in 
their countries. 
 
3 Results 
 
In order to obtain our final model specification, we used a general to specific approach, 
starting with all the variables listed in Box 1. At each stage, we omitted the variable that was 
least significant in the previous stages. In order to capture developments in the economy prior 
to the crisis and to avoid endogenous effects of crises on the explanatory variables all 
variables were lagged by one period, apart from real house price growth which has 3 lags. We 
allow house price growth to have a longer lag because it is an indicator of potential lending 
problems that frequently develop as a consequence of a house price bubble. Besides being 
essential to obtain a true “early warning”
12, lagging variables is also econometrically sound 
since the driving variables also respond to a crisis and hence are jointly determined in the 
current period. 
 
                                                 
12 It is notable that some of the work in this area uses current levels and not lags and so is only providing 
“Contemporaneous Confirmation Indicators” of crises.   10
As expected in the context of the OECD, all of the “traditional” variables proved 
insignificant, despite experimentation with different lag lengths. For example, domestic credit 
growth was insignificant with a negative sign. Decreasing the order of lags increased its 
significance, with the current value becoming significant at the 5 per cent probability level, 
although the negative sign of the parameter was an indication of the scarcity of available 
credit once the banking crisis materialised. The specific variable deletions and their 
corresponding t-statistics are listed in Table 2. We test for joint elimination of insignificant 
variables and the F statistic is insignificant at 0.318. 
 
We also applied our final specification to data for 1980 – 2007 (see Table 3) to ensure our 
conclusions were unaffected by the sub-prime episode. Given that they were not affected , we 
accepted equation 3 as our final EWS.  
 
Table 2: The General To Specific Approach      
LIQ(-1)
-0.118   
(-3.55)
-0.124  
(-3.55)
-0.137  
(-3.64)
-0.135  
(-3.55)
-0.135   
(-3.45)
-0.144   
(-3.39)
-0.147  
(-3.25)
LEV(-1)
-0.333   
(-2.85)
-0.239  
(-1.90)
-0.315  
(-2.24)
-0.247  
(-1.64)
-0.271   
(-1.67)
-0.280   
(-1.72)
-0.273  
(-1.62)
RHPG(-3)
0.113   
(2.8)
0.113   
(2.87)
0.104   
(2.67)
0.100   
(2.59)
0.104   
(2.67)
0.108    
(2.76)
0.110   
(2.67)
DCG(-1) -
-0.099  
(-1.82)
-0.10   
(-1.97)
-0.10   
(-1.86)
-0.10    
(-1.99)
-0.13    
(-1.98)
-0.13   
(-1.98)
RIR(-1) - -
0.084   
(1.37)
0.085   
(1.40)
0.165   
(1.41)
0.173    
(1.46)
0.166   
(1.30)
M2RES(-1) - - -
-0.00   
(-1.0)
-0.00    
(-1.0)
-0.00    
(-1.1)
-0.00   
(-1.1)
I N F L ( - 1 )----
-0.13    
(-0.8)
-0.14    
(-0.8)
-0.13   
(-0.7)
YG(-1) - - - - -
0.116    
(0.65)
0.125   
(0.66)
BB(-1) - - - - - -
-0.013  
(-0.1)  
Note: estimation period 1980-2006; t-statistics in parentheses; LIQ-liquidity ratio, LEV- unweighted capital 
adequacy ratio, YG-real GDP growth, RPHG-real house price inflation, BB-budget balance to GDP ratio, 
DCG-domestic credit growth, M2RES-M2 to reserves ratio, RIR-real interest rates, DEP-depreciation, INFL-
inflation. 
 
   11
 
Table 3: Comparing the Effects of Sample Period on Estimation Results 
1980-2006 1980-2007
LIQ
-0.118    
(-3.55)
-0.13       (-
4.1)
LEV
-0.333    
(-2.85)
-0.261    
(-2.51)
PHG
0.113     
(2.8)
0.106     
(2.79)
Estimation period
 
 
log ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
p(crisis) - 1
p(crisis)
  = - 0.333 LEV(-1) – 0.118 LIQ(-1) + 0.113 RHPG(-3)    (3) 
(-2.85)               (-3.55)       (2.8)   
 
where p(crisis) is the probability of crisis occurrence and t-statistics are given below each 
coefficient. 
 
The results in Table 2 clearly show that increased unweighted capital adequacy and liquidity 
ratios in the banking sector has a beneficial impact of reducing crisis probability.
13 Those 
banking systems with healthy levels of capital one year prior to the crisis were less likely to 
collapse, as were those that held relatively high levels of cash and securities on their balance 
sheets. On the other hand, higher real house price growth three years prior to the crisis 
suggests a prolonged period of risky mortgage lending by banks will unambiguously increase 
the chances of borrower default and thus a crisis.  
 
Since the impacts of unweighted capital adequacy ratios, liquidity and house price growth on 
the log-odds of crisis have not been previously quantified, it is worth investigating their 
                                                 
13 The corresponding Wald test statistic which tests for the joint insignificance of all other explanatory variables 
listed in Box1 proves that apart from unweighted capital adequacy ratios, liquidity and real house price growth 
all other variables were insignificant. The actual probability (under the F distribution) was 31%.    12
individual marginal effects on crises as simply observing the coefficients in equation 3 cannot 
produce a meaningful ranking of variable importance. Table 4 shows the marginal 
contribution of each variable to crisis probability for the entire 1980 – 2006 estimation period. 
Since the marginal effect of each variable is contingent on the values taken by all other 
variables, it is customary to compute marginals whilst holding all other variables at their 
sample mean values.  
 
Table 4. Marginal effect of a 1 point rise in the variable on crisis probability. 
LIQ LEV RHPG
BG -0.17 -0.49 0.17
CN -0.22 -0.61 0.21
DK -0.05 -0.14 0.05
FN -0.23 -0.65 0.22
FR -0.78 -2.17 0.74
GE -0.23 -0.65 0.22
IT -0.17 -0.46 0.16
JP -0.38 -1.05 0.36
NL -0.56 -1.57 0.53
NW -0.33 -0.91 0.31
SD -0.12 -0.34 0.12
SP -0.08 -0.24 0.08
UK -1.19 -3.32 1.13
US -0.08 -0.22 0.07  
Note: percentage points. Country definitions in note to Table 1 
 
Of the three leading indicators, the unweighted capital adequacy ratio consistently exerts the 
highest marginal reduction on banking crisis likelihood, irrespective of the country in 
question. The highest impact occurs in the UK and France because their mean unweighted 
capital adequacy ratio measures were lower than the remaining sample. The implication is 
that a one point rise in the unweighted capital adequacy ratio alone could reduce crisis 
probability by at least 0.14 % (Denmark) and by as much as 3.32% (UK). The next highest 
marginal impact occurs via improved liquidity. If, in aggregate, banks simply increased their 
holdings of cash and short-term securities by one point, with no attention to other variables, 
the reduction in crisis probability would be at least 0.08% (USA) and could be as high as 
1.19% (UK). Again the effect in the UK is highest due to the lowest sample mean liquidity,   13
whilst in the US it is lowest due to the converse. It is worth noting the apparently high 
liquidity held in the US was overestimated in the sense that the measure ignored the liquidity 
risk attached to sub-prime securitised assets and that once this materialised, actual liquidity in 
the US banking sector evaporated. The sub-prime episode has drawn attention to the 
importance of off-balance sheet items affecting crisis probabilities, an issue that requires 
further work. 
 
Even with no deterioration in the health of bank balance sheets, a point rise in real house price 
growth is sufficient to raise the probability of a crisis by at least 0.07% (US) and by as much 
as 0.74% (France). This general result conforms to the traditional banking crisis literature on 
leading indicators of crises including Borio and Drehmann (2009) and recent findings by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) who note the sub-prime episode was no different from previous 
OECD cases which were characterised by house price booms in the run up to crises. Whereas 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) simply identify property prices as a leading indicator, we are able 
to quantify their impact and the impact of unweighted capital adequacy ratios and liquidity in 
the run-up to the sub-prime episode. For more detailed discussion see Appendix 1. 
 
Given the results described above, we now turn to see which crises were picked up by our 
EWS. Figure 1 below shows the actual in-sample crisis probabilities against the EWS fitted 
values. If we use the in-sample probability of crisis as a cut-off threshold
14 to identify which 
crises are called, for our sample we obtain a cut-off threshold of 0.032 (3.2%). Based on this 
threshold, our model is able to correctly identify 8 out of the 12 crises in the estimation 
period, equivalent to a 66% success rate, implying that we would outperform a random naïve 
model which would only call crises on 50% of occasions. The corresponding type II error rate 
is 29%, but encouragingly, many of these so-called false alarms actually occur close to the 
                                                 
14 In the manner of Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).   14
crisis onset, implying the EWS predictions are at least able to distinguish between episodes of 
financial stability and instability and in many cases can identify actual crisis onset. Table 5 
gives details of the in-sample predictive performances for each country and the relation of any 
false alarms to the timing of crises, and it is clear the false call rate is better described as 25%. 
High call rates are observed for France, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and the UK, all of which 
either experienced crises or had major crises in the post estimation period. The highest call 
rate is in the UK, but it also has the highest crisis frequency, with four crises recorded in IMF 
and World Bank sources. The high call rate in Japan reflects the nature of the dummy we use 
to indicate crises, as it catches the start of a crisis but does not reflect the length of the crisis. 
Six of the calls in Japan were in the years following the start of the crisis and reflect the depth 
and length of the event.  The call rate is low in the US, reflecting the unusual nature of the 
crisis experienced in 2007. It however spread to other countries through the banking system 
and hence our indicators picked up effects elsewhere. 
 
Figure 1: Probability of crises according to the logit model 
0.00
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0.40
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US - 99
Probability Crisis
 
Country definitions in note to Table 1 
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Table 5: In-Sample Prediction 
  
Total 
Calls 
Crises 
Aftermath 
of the  
Crises 
False 
Calls 
Timing of False Calls relative to Crisis Onset 
BG 0  0  0  0   
CN 6  1  1  4  next  year 
DK 0  0  0  0   
FN 10  1  1  8  next  year 
FR 14  1  0  13   
GE 4  0  0  4   
IT  7  0  2  5  2nd and 3rd years 
JP  15  1  6  8  Next 7 years, with a break on the 4th year 
NL 18  0  0  18   
NW  14  1  2  11  next 2 years 
SD 6  1  1  4  next  year 
SP 2  0  0  2   
UK 20  2  0  18   
US 0  0  0  0   
total 116 8  13  95   
Country definitions in notes to Table 1 
 
Based on these results we would argue that an EWS based on liquidity ratios, unweighted 
capital adequacy ratios and real house price growth would significantly improve policy 
makers’ abilities to avert crises in the OECD. To verify our claim, we next turn to out-of-
sample prediction to see if our EWS is able to detect the sub-prime episode in any of the 
OECD economies. We base our results on two crises definitions given in Borio and 
Drehmann (2009). According to Definition 1, a crisis occurs in “countries where the 
government had to inject capital in more than one large bank and/ or more than one large bank 
failed”. By the end of January 2009 this definition classified the US, the UK, Belgium, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands as in crises in our sample. Definition 2, which is less 
stringent, states countries experienced a crisis when “countries undertook at least two of the 
following policy operations: issue wholesale guarantees, buy assets, inject capital into at least 
one large bank, or announce a large scale recapitalisation programme”. Under this definition,   16
all the countries previously listed experienced crises but in addition, Canada, Denmark, Italy, 
Spain and Sweden also fell into the crisis list in our sample. 
 
Using the same cut-off threshold as before (the predicted probability exceeds the sample 
average of 3.2 per cent), we derived out-of-sample predictions for all the countries in our 
sample for the years 2007 and 2008. If a crisis was called in any country we then checked the 
Borio and Drehmann (2009) definition to see if a crisis had actually materialised there or not. 
The results are given in Table 6 which indicates any crises called by our EWS in columns 1 
and 2 and the corresponding crisis occurrence according to the definitions. As can be seen, 
our EWS was able to call 4 out of 6 crises according to definition 1, and 6 out of 10 crises 
according to definition 2, with false calls in only two countries. Given that we were able to 
call 66% of crises in-sample, our model has not lost any of its predictive power out-of-
sample. This is the ultimate test of any EWS, in the sense that they are known to have better 
in-sample performance compared to out-of-sample predictive ability. On the basis of these 
results, we argue that our EWS specification would be a valuable tool for any OECD policy 
maker wishing to avert future crises. Moreover, we now go on to show our specification is 
extremely robust and can therefore be used with confidence. 
 
Table 6: Out of sample predictions 
2007 2008 definition1 definition2
B G XXXX
CN - - -
DK - -
FN - X
F R XXXX
G E ----
IT X - X
JP - -
NL X - X X
NW X X
SD - - -
SP X X X
U K XXXX
U S ----  
Country definitions in note to Table 1   17
 
4.   Robustness Tests 
 
Our conclusions do not change when we thoroughly test our coefficients for robustness. To 
examine the possibility that our results are driven by variable behaviour in an individual 
economy, we re-estimate the logit equation by dropping the systemic crises economies 
individually. This results in the deletion of UK, US, Norway and Finland and Japan one by 
one, yet in each case, all our coefficients retain their significance, sign and order of 
magnitude. To ensure a further degree of robustness, we also re-estimate the logit function 
after dropping the US and Japan together since it could be argued that our results are driven 
by the non-European crises. Again, the separation of crises by region made no difference to 
the impacts of liquidity ratios, unweighted capital adequacy ratios or real house price growth 
on crisis probability demonstrating the importance of these variables in all OECD banking 
crises. The results of the country elimination tests are given in Tables 7. 
 
Table 7. Results for country elimination tests 
LIQ(-1)
-0.118    
(-3.55)
-0.143   
(-2.99)
-0.125    
(-3.55)
-0.111    
(-3.28)
-0.119    
(-3.29)
-0.124    
(-3.59)
-0.121    
(-3.5)
-0.115    
(-3.41)
LEV(-1)
-0.333    
(-2.85)
-0.3     
(-1.78)
-0.339    
(-2.79)
-0.344    
(-2.94)
-0.349    
(-2.86)
-0.282    
(-2.38)
-0.293    
(-2.43)
-0.343    
(-2.87)
PHG(-3)
0.113     
(2.8)
0.152   
(3.44)
0.119     
(2.82)
0.111     
(2.74)
0.118     
(2.76)
0.089     
(2.04)
0.083     
(1.84)
0.107     
(2.58)
Final 
panel
US not 
included
Japan not 
included
US and 
Japan not 
included
UK not 
included
Norway 
not 
included
Finland 
not 
included
Sweden 
not 
included
 
 
Next, we turn to crisis dates in recognition of the fact that timing the onset of a crisis relies on 
some degree of subjective judgement and it could therefore be suggested that our results are 
dependent on the specific crisis dates we happened to choose. If several different crisis 
definitions generate the same start date for a given crisis, we would conclude that subjectivity   18
does not distort the timing of the crisis. If however, the same crisis is timed differently 
according to different definitions, we might worry that subjectivity has biased our 
coefficients. Accordingly, we turn to the recent work of Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) who 
examined the causes of OECD crises and compared our crisis dates to theirs. Their crises 
dates differ for Japan and the US as they date them as 1992 and 1984 respectively. For 
additional robustness, we redefine the crisis dummy for Japan (crisis in 1992) and the US 
(crisis in 1984) but find this makes no difference to our results as can be seen in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Effect of alternative crisis dates on variable significance 
LIQ(-1)
-0.118    
(-3.55)
-0.119    
(-3.56)
-0.12     
(-3.58)
LEV(-1)
-0.333    
(-2.85)
-0.332    
(-2.85)
-0.317    
(-2.73)
PHG(-3)
0.113     
(2.8)
0.113     
(2.8)
0.104     
(2.56)
Japanese  
crisis at 
1992
US crisis 
at 1984
Final 
version
 
 
Another criticism of our crisis dummy could be that the one year duration could affect our 
results. Assuming the dummy takes a value of one only for the year in which the crisis starts, 
and zero otherwise could mean that we are relating post-crisis explanatory variables to 
supposed non-crisis periods when the economy in question could still be in a crisis. We 
adopted this procedure to identify which variables contribute to the switch between non-crisis 
and crisis states, rather than to identify which variables prolong the crisis. It is useful to test 
whether relaxing the assumption that crises last for one year changes our results. By looking 
at our crisis definitions and indentifying the duration of each crisis, we can drop all 
observations for the years in which the crisis persisted. This reduces the number of false calls 
and also removes data that would ‘call’ a new crisis whilst an existing one continued. This   19
allows us to verify the sensitivity of our results to crises durations and avoids endogeneity 
between the crisis itself and the explanatory variables in the post-crisis period. Our results 
continue to be robust; even when we drop post-crisis observations, the significance of our 
coefficients does not change as Table 9 shows. 
 
Table 9. Impact of the elimination of continuing-crisis observations on variable 
significance 
LIQ(-1)
-0.118    
(-3.55)
-0.111    
(-3.48)
LEV(-1)
-0.333    
(-2.85)
-0.329    
(-2.91)
PHG(-3)
0.113     
(2.8)
0.111     
(2.74)
Final 
version
Aftermath 
of the 
Crisis
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In contrast to the existing literature, we have estimated equations for early warning systems 
for banking crises in OECD countries using not only standard indicators but also measures of 
bank capital and liquidity adequacy and of property price growth. These have not been 
assessed as indicators previously. We find that bank capital adequacy, bank liquidity and 
property prices impact on banking crisis probabilities and tend to exclude more traditional 
variables such as GDP growth, inflation and real interest rates. Furthermore, the model can be 
used to detect increases in crisis probabilities out-of-sample in the run up to the sub-prime 
episode. Moreover, the importance of capital and liquidity adequacy and house price growth 
remains invariant to different robustness tests.  
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Our results have important policy implications for financial regulators and central banks. The 
need for high levels of capital in banks is underlined, as is the need for liquidity on the asset 
side. Furthermore, suppressing rapid property price growth may well mitigate future OECD 
crises. Given the difficulties of using monetary policy to counteract risks to financial stability 
and monetary stability with one instrument (e.g. use of interest rates to limit asset price 
bubbles in a low-inflation context), use of supervisory instruments such as capital adequacy 
on mortgage loans or limits on loan to value ratios on mortgage lending may be warranted. 
 
The suspicion that bank capital adequacy and liquidity are countercyclical (as is shown for 
example in Babihuga (2007)) means that measures to restrict procyclicality of the financial 
system are also validated by our results. There is already an approach in operation in Spain 
which raises capital adequacy when credit grows rapidly, and this policy is supported by our 
results. Repullo et al (2009) recommend that in order to mitigate procyclicality there should 
be adjustments of capital requirements using a simple multiplier that depends on the deviation 
of the rate of growth of GDP from respect to its long-run average. As discussed in 
Brunnermeier et al (2009), an alternative is a response of capital adequacy to debt-equity, 
maturity mismatch, credit growth and asset price growth, suitably weighted – a broader 
approach that our results underpin. Liquidity risk could be reduced by “marking to funding” 
and capital charges against illiquidity. It is encouraging to see that the latest regulatory 
response to the global banking crisis, The Turner Review (Financial Services Authority 2009) 
is consistent with our results, in calling for improved quality of liquidity and capital adequacy 
in the UK banking system, for countercyclical ratios and also a focus on a unweighted capital 
adequacy ratio
15 as well as risk adjusted capital adequacy. 
                                                 
15 To quote the recommendations of the Turner Review, “A maximum gross leverage ratio should be introduced 
as a backstop discipline against excessive growth in absolute balance sheet size” (ibid, page 7).   21
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Appendix 1 
 
Marginal Effects 
 
The marginal effects in Table 4 were based on sample mean values of the indicators. 
However, to assess their true contribution to the current crisis, we evaluate the marginals on 
the basis of ex-ante data in Table A1. Marginals are computed using 2006 data values, 
because this was in advance of the 2007 sub-prime episode. Hence when we compute the 
2006 marginal impacts we are actually utilising 2005 values for liquidity and unweighted 
capital adequacy ratios (both lagged 1) and 2003 values for real house price growth (lagged 
3). Henceforth for ease of exposition we will refer to these as 2006 values.   
 
Table A1: Marginal effect of a 1 point rise on the probability of a crisis using 2006 data 
values 
LIQ LEV RHPG
BG -0.27 -0.76 0.26
CN -0.12 -0.35 0.12
DK -0.09 -0.24 0.08
FN -0.32 -0.91 0.31
FR -0.43 -1.22 0.42
GE -0.09 -0.25 0.08
IT -0.64 -1.78 0.61
JP -0.02 -0.06 0.02
NL -0.35 -0.97 0.33
NW -0.65 -1.81 0.62
SD -0.17 -0.48 0.17
SP -0.39 -1.08 0.37
UK -2.38 -6.68 2.28
US -0.05 -0.14 0.05  
Note: percentage point. LIQ and LEV are at 2005 values owing to lag 1 and PHPG is at 2003 levels owing to 
lag 3 Country definitions in note to Table 1 
 
Comparing Tables 4 and A1 show there were clear changes in the marginal impacts of 
liquidity, unweighted capital adequacy ratios and property prices just before the sub-prime 
crisis relative to the sample mean. If the difference between the absolute marginal based on 
sample averages and the absolute marginal based on 2006 data is positive (ceteris paribus) the 
variable’s impact on crisis probability has increased. This could arise for three reasons: either 
the 2005 level of liquidity or the unweighted capital adequacy ratio is lower than the sample   24
mean level or that real house price growth has recently overshot the average. For example, in 
the case of liquidity, an increase in the marginal effect would imply aggregate liquidity levels 
in 2005 were too low and since liquidity was so scarce, a marginal improvement in capital and 
reserves would have a stronger crisis reducing effect than in other years. A similar story 
would apply to the unweighted capital adequacy ratio, whilst for real house price growth 
(which is for 2003 values given the 3 year lag) the converse would be true. Since the house 
price coefficient is positive, the higher the level of house price growth the greater the 
marginal impact on crisis likelihood. Thus a positive marginal change describes a situation 
where 2003 growth rates of house prices were higher than the sample average and 
consequently, any additional pressure on the housing bubble could have severe consequences 
for the banking system.  To illustrate the changes in marginal impacts, Table A2 computes the 
difference between the 2006 marginal effects and the marginals based on sample means. 
 
Table A2: Change in the Marginal Impacts in the run up to the sub-prime crisis (2006); 
All Variables Held at Values Relevant to 2006 
LIQ LEV RHPG
BG 0.10 0.28 0.09
CN -0.10 -0.27 -0.09
DK 0.04 0.10 0.04
FN 0.09 0.26 0.09
FR -0.34 -0.95 -0.32
GE -0.15 -0.41 -0.14
IT 0.47 1.32 0.45
JP -0.35 -0.99 -0.34
NL -0.21 -0.59 -0.20
NW 0.32 0.89 0.30
SD 0.05 0.15 0.05
SP 0.30 0.85 0.29
UK 1.20 3.35 1.14
US -0.03 -0.08 -0.03  
Country definitions in note to Table 1 
 
Table A2 displays the combined marginal effects of all variables in the run up to crises, 
because all variables take on their 2006 (2005 and 2003) values. Hence, for example when we 
say the ability of higher unweighted capital adequacy ratios to reduce crisis probability   25
increases ex-ante, we are taking this effect conditional on the fact that liquidity and house 
price growth were displaying a certain ex-ante behaviour.  To isolate the pure change in the 
marginal effect of a variable on crisis probability, we compute the marginal effect of each 
variable in 2006, holding the two other variables constant at their sample mean values (Table 
A3). 
 
Table A3:  Change in the Marginal Impacts in the run up to the sub-prime crisis, 
variable in question held at 2006 or 2004 values; all Other Variables Held at Sample 
Means 
LIQ LEV RHPG
BG 0.01 0.01 0.07
CN -0.12 -0.09 0.08
DK 0.01 0.09 0.00
FN 0.23 -0.33 0.09
FR -0.53 -0.32 0.65
GE -0.12 -0.05 -0.04
IT 0.41 -0.18 0.13
JP -0.29 -0.57 -0.14
NL -0.28 0.63 -0.06
NW 0.32 -0.07 0.02
SD -0.03 0.03 0.03
SP 0.05 0.01 0.14
UK 0.08 -0.10 1.10
US 0.01 -0.13 0.02  
Country definitions in note to Table 1 
 
The two tables yield interesting insights into the contribution of each variable to crises. If 
other variables behave as they do on average, the ability of liquidity to reduce crisis 
probability increases in 2006 in most countries. For example, a one point increase in liquidity 
in Belgium would have reduced crisis likelihood by 0.01 percentage points if unweighted 
capital adequacy ratios and house prices had behaved “normally”. But once we allow these 
two variables to take on their 2006 values, the liquidity levels in Belgium become much more 
important for crisis prevention; the marginal effect is now ten times higher at 0.10 percentage 
points. Similarly significant impacts of liquidity are observed for Denmark and Spain, with 
the most dramatic effect being observed in the UK. Moreover, the result is heterogeneous   26
because in some countries such as Finland and France, once the other variables were allowed 
to take on their 2006 values, the marginal effect of liquidity actually fell, whilst in the US the 
ability of liquidity to prevent a crisis actually fell given the ex-ante dynamics of the other 
variables. This may be because by 2006, increased liquidity in the banking system may have 
further fuelled the last phase of the property price bubble. 
 
The marginal impact of unweighted capital adequacy ratios in some countries is even more 
dramatic than liquidity. For example, in Belgium, once liquidity and house price growth took 
on their levels relevant to 2006, the ability of higher cash and reserves to bring down the risk 
of crisis rose from the “average” level of 0.01 percentage points to 0.28 percentage points. 
Similarly important increases were observed for Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain and the UK, 
suggesting that intervention to improve the capital base of banks in these countries would 
have had beneficial effects. Conversely, the marginal impact of unweighted capital adequacy 
ratios on crisis probability in Canada, France, Germany and Japan actually fell in the run-up 
to the sub-prime episode, implying at this stage, an improvement in capital could not avert the 
crisis by much. 
 
The most interesting marginal impacts are those displayed by real house price growth. In most 
countries, once liquidity and unweighted capital adequacy ratios were allowed to take on their 
2006 values, the ability of further house price increases (in 2003) to cause crises increased.  
 
 